The United States Army adopted a preferred style of mission command that was based on a leadership policy taken from the German, this new style of commanding was more flexible and based on mission goals. The military officers had the freedom to take tactical decisions for achieving strategic objectives.1 This military concept allows leaders on the battlefield to coordinate with their subordinates in a decision-making incentive on the comprehension of the mission objectives by applying the doctrines of assessing, visualizing, guiding, describing, and comprehending the operating environment. Before the Battle of Antietam, people considered the commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George B. McClellan, one of the best tacticians in the army; hence, his nickname was ‘Young Napoleon’.[1] Nonetheless, despite his previous heroics as a leader on the battlefield, many criticized McClellan for making a series of indefinite decisions in addition to his inability to synchronize attacks that could have given him victory over the army of Northern Virginia. However, some individuals feel that these critics were unfair. Actually, Major General George B. McClellan had applied some of the six principles of mission command while taking decisions on the battlefield. This essay is an analysis of his war strategy, which provides a definitive judgment of his actions at the Battle of Antietam. On September 17, 1862, the Union Army, under the leadership of Major General George B. McClellan, encountered the Confederate Army, led by General Robert E. Lee in Sharpsburg, Maryland, in a battle that was termed as ‘The Battle of Antietam’[2]. The beginning of the conflict saw the start of the bloodiest day of combat in the Civil War history with 22,000 causalities. This was the first time throughout the Civil War that the Confederate and Union forces faced each other on Northern soil. General McClellan’s failure to achieve the mission command principles that would have helped him to assess, visualize, and comprehend the moves that would have aided the Union Army to destroy a weaker Confederate Army[3] was censured. The war that ensued in the initial attack at Sunken Road, Burnside’s Bridge, as well as the concluding push at the end, highlighted how Major General McClellan was unsuccessful to apply the mission command principles. Thus, during the battle of Antietam, Major General McClellan did not take his opportunities; hence he allowed the vulnerable Confederate Army to withdraw and reorganize for future campaigns.
Leadership Analysis: The Six Principles of Mission Command
Building Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
The success of a military mission is dependent on the cohesion of a team of operatives from commanders, subordinates, to partners. Commanders need to uphold the values in the Army to gain the trust and loyalty of their subordinates. By communicating with their soldiers, leaders build an interpersonal relationship that is bound to develop a cohesive team[4]. Major McClellan’s most admirable attribute was his ability to drill troops and inspire loyalty and trust, which made Sear consider his failures the defects of his virtues[5]. The main aim of the Major was to win the battle by tactfully utilizing the strength of the personnel and other resources rather than by some cruel and cunning strategy. Memoirs from soldiers under the Major showed individuals who saw themselves as a form of Special Forces due to the commander’s constant communication, praise, and inspiration during failure and success[6]. Nevertheless, leaders can construct or lose trust through everyday dealings and this was a fact that McClellan overlooked due to his distaste of the Commander-in-Chief. One of the most renowned values in the army is respect towards superiors. However, McClellan constantly referred to the president as a “well-mannered baboon”, an aspect that weakened his position as a leader[7]. Coupled with frequent incidences of insubordination, he lost the mutual trust of his troops at the Battle of Antietam. Meanwhile, he constantly insisted that the president was the cause of his loss on the ground; however, his constant abuse saw him fail to manage a beaten group of soldiers.
Creating Shared Understanding
Through continuous communication, the commanders and their subordinates can maintain a shared comprehension throughout the operational processes of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. True leaders must utilize every available chance to solve the existing problems; for this, they must create a suitable atmosphere of understanding.9 Moreover, a shared understanding enforces trust and loyalty because of the existence of interpersonal relationships. It takes time and effort to create an environment that encourages the sharing of ideas. Hence, the commanders must develop conditions that facilitate shared understanding. Major McClellan was known to be open with his soldiers, and he shared his experiences, successes, as well as his failures with his men. Unfortunately, he also shared his opinion on certain issues that may have led to his downfall as an effective military commander. McClellan believed that the Confederate outnumbered his forces and was substantially better than his own, a factor that affected the soldiers’ morale.[8] Additionally, with similar conviction, he believed that the president was an enemy that conspired to see him and his troops defeated. Evidently, the leader’s perception led to a drop in personnel morale on the battlefield.
Providing a Clear Commander’s Intent
At every stage of war, the intentions of a commander change in regards to achieving the objectives of the final mission. These alterations should be made clear and expressed concisely for the operation. Precision in expression aids soldiers and supporting commanders to act in a particular manner without additional orders during the battle, even if the focus of the operation changes. The commander’s intent includes the task, purpose, and the desired result so that forces comprehend what they ought to do in addition to why they are acting in a particular manner.[9] When Soldiers have a clear view of the broader purpose of the actions that are beyond the mission statement, it is easier to have a shared understanding of their efforts. Major McClellan was clear in expressing his intent to his superiors in Washington as well as to his subordinates on the ground. The Army of the Potomac always had details of McClellan’s idea of the way every single war was fought; this is the reason for his high success rate as an inspirational leader.[10] Nonetheless, the Major was overwhelmed by the position that he held; it affected his intent in winning the war. He used to say that the personal identification of the soldiers was dependent on his aims and not that of the president.[11] He nurtured this belief because a strong and focused commander seemed to boost the confidence of the soldiers. Hence, he thought that a leader like him influenced and inspired the military forces rather than a president.
Exercising Disciplined Initiative
the disciplined initiative is described as the action taken in absence of orders or when the prevailing orders have the potential to risk the mission objectives due to unforeseen opportunities or threats. The critical factor that enables the exercise of the disciplined initiative is clarity in regards to the commander’s intent because it allows a troop of operatives to make faster progress towards the objective. Major General George B. McClellan was known as a ‘hands-on’ military leader who offered clear intent to his troops; however, he always discouraged his men from making situational decisions[12]. Major General McClellan stalling because of his need to bring up siege guns to Yorktown proved unnecessary as the enemy fell back[13]. If only he had offered his troops freedom to make situational decisions on the battlefield, Major General McClellan would have taken advantage of the confederates withdrawal
Using Mission Orders
Each war, conflict, or battle was taken up by the military has an objective that is fulfilled by mission orders undertaken by subordinates. They provide direction and guidance that focus activities on achieving the objective, set priorities, allocate resources, and influence the situation.[14] McClellan was a calculative commander who articulated his missions clearly to his superiors and subordinates.
Accepting Prudent Risk
Casualties in war are a norm; however, commanders must keep these numbers as low as possible. This feature was McClellan’s weakness, as his tendency of being excessively cautious was paralyzing mounting an attack when he had the advantage of Confederates retreating. Colonel Oliver Spaulding saw that McClellan was not content with the number of men in his command and was unwilling to get the best he could with the troops he had.[15] Additionally, McClellan demonstrated several grave insufficiencies as an operational commander when he failed to move his vastly superior army swiftly into advantageous positions in the early days of the campaign; an instance is the happenings at Yorktown.[16]
Conclusion
‘The Battle of Antietam’ was Major General George B. McClellan’s most defining war as a military leader because it highlighted his failures and not successful as it was always the case in other conflicts. From the information provided, he was an inspirational, tactical, and virtuous military commander. However, his lack of swift action, insubordination, and lack of risk-taking led to his downfall. A verdict on his leadership skills is that despite his great profile, he is not an admirable military leader. The 21st century dictates that a military commander ought to be conversant with the six principles of mission command to attain victories on the battlefield. The Major had not followed a few of them, which might because of his failure as a leader.
Bibliography
Heyward, Richard D. Embedding Mission Command in Army Culture. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2013.
Madey, Gregory R., M. Brian Blake, Christian Poellabauer, Hongsheng Lu, R. Ryan McCune, and Yi Wei. “Applying DDDAS Principles to Command, Control, and Mission Planning for UAV Swarms.” Procedia Computer Science 9 (2012): 1177-1186.
McPherson, James M., and George Henry Davis. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War era. No. 6. Oxford University Press, 1988.
Priest, John M. Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain. White Mane Publishing Company, 1992.
Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003.
Waugh, John C. Lincoln, and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010.
Wittmann, Jochen. Auftragstaktik: Just a Command Technique or the Core Pillar of Mastering the Military Operational Art?. BoD–Books on Demand, 2012.
[1] John, Priest, M. Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain. White Mane Publishing Company, 1992.
[2] Stephen Sears W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003.
[3] John Waugh, C. Lincoln, and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010.
[4] Madey et al.,” Applying DDDAS principles to command, control and mission planning for UAV swarms.” Procedia Computer Science 9 (2012): 1177-1186.
[5] Stephen Sears W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003.
[6] James, McPherson, M., and George Henry Davis. Battle cry of freedom: The Civil War era. No. 6. Oxford University Press, 1988.
[7] John Waugh, C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010.
[8] John Waugh, C. Lincoln, and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010
[9] Richard, Heyward, D. Embedding Mission Command in Army Culture. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2013.
[10] John, Priest, M. Before Antietam: The Battle for South Mountain. White Mane Publishing Company, 1992.
[11] Ibid.
[12] John Waugh, C. Lincoln and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Jochen, Wittmann. Auftragstaktik: Just a Command Technique Or the Core Pillar of Mastering the Military Operational Art?. BoD–Books on Demand, 2012
[15] John Waugh, C. Lincoln, and McClellan: The Troubled Partnership Between a President and His General. St. Martin’s Press, 2010
[16] Ibid.